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SUMMARY

After 4 years of Soviet occupation, Afghanistan remains a turbulent, war-torn country. During the past year, the Afghan resistance continued to wage guerrilla warfare, thwarting Soviet efforts to extend regime control. With a modest increase of its troops in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was unable to force a dramatic reduction in the resistance.

Although the military impasse continues, significant changes occurred in both Soviet and resistance tactics. The U.S.S.R. has stepped up the pace of the war since Konstantin Chernenko became the Soviet leader in February 1984. The Soviets increased attacks on civilians, expanded their use of air power, employed high-level saturation bombing, and deployed Soviet forces more often and in greater number.

The mujahidin (resistance fighters) offset these intensified Soviet actions by using more sophisticated weaponry and tactics and improving cooperation among various fighting groups. These changes were most apparent in their defense of the Panjsher Valley against the seventh Soviet offensive and during the mujahidin attacks on Kabul.

The Afghan Government in Kabul is unable to extend its authority effectively outside the capital. The Soviet-backed

People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) continues to suffer from infighting, disloyalty, and defections among the ranks.

Living conditions in Afghanistan continue to deteriorate. With fighting throughout the country, no one in Afghanistan can feel secure. Food, electricity, fuel, and medical care are frequently in short supply. Although the flow of refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan has diminished considerably since 1982, the presence of the largest refugee population in the world strains the resources of Pakistan. Meanwhile, violations of Pakistan's territory by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) continued throughout 1984. Overflights and shellings increased in frequency and intensity during August and September.

No significant progress occurred in the UN-sponsored negotiations during 1984. The United States supports the negotiations, as well as the UN General Assembly resolution on Afghanistan approved again this year. Another round of indirect talks is expected in February 1985.

Although the negotiations continue, the Soviets appear determined to retain control of Afghanistan by remodeling the Afghan political and social structure in the Soviet image. In the short term, this entails maintaining their client regime in power in Kabul and cutting off the resistance from its bases of support. Control over countrywide security, education, and the economy, and the development of a committed socialist cadre, are each essential to an apparent long-term strategy to "sovietize" Afghanistan.

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

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MILITARY SITUATION

In 1984, as since 1980, the Soviets and the resistance remain at an impasse with neither side able to make significant or lasting gains at the expense of their enemy. Major combat activity occurred in all areas of the country, concentrated around the major cities, the Panjaher Valley, and provinces bordering Pakistan.

Eastern Afghanistan

Kabul. The resistance succeeded in threatening the overall security of Kabul, the bastion of Soviet/PDPA regime control, particularly in late summer and fall. Besides occasional assassinations and kidnappings of Soviet and regime officials, and the occasional food and fuel shortages caused by the resistance interdiction of supply convoys, the resistance used ground assaults, rocket attacks, electrical outages, and bombings to make Kabul appear at times to be a city under siege.

As a result of these attacks, the security situation deteriorated substantially. The Soviets responded by tightening security throughout the city and around the airport and by increasing retaliatory attacks on areas from which the mujahidin had launched their attacks.

The heaviest fighting inside Kabul in 1984 occurred in September. On September 24 the resistance coordinated a heavy assault on several targets, in one of the largest attacks on Kabul since the war began, that culminated in an intense 2-hour battle near the military base at the Bala Hissar fortress in the heart of the city. Fifteen Soviet armored vehicles were destroyed and 40-50 Afghan soldiers killed in the clash. As is typical after such attacks, the Soviets retaliated with air and ground forces, targeting villages south of Kabul and inflicting civilian casualties.

Throughout the year the resistance regularly and successfully rocketed selected areas of Kabul but sometimes struck unintended targets. Rockets landed near the U.S. Embassy and other foreign missions, where only minor damage occurred, and other parts of the city, where greater damage sometimes resulted.

In the latter part of the year, rocket attacks occurred with increasing frequency and intensity. One of the most intense attacks occurred on September 20 with at least 16 or 17 rockets hitting the eastern part of Kabul. Afterward,

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Soviet helicopters characteristically retaliated against the civilian population in villages south of Kabul. In another incident, the Soviet Embassy celebration of this anniversary of the October Revolution was disrupted when the

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sound of rockets exploding nearby caused the hurried departure of guests. In late November and early December, Kabul suffered additional major rocket attacks.

The resistance caused severe electrical outages in Kabul during August and September by destroying a series of pylons from the hydroelectric plant at Sorubi, east of Kabul. During this operation the resistance obtained the collaboration of a local tribal group which the Soviets previously had attempted to coopt. This action was filmed by a television crew and broadcast in the United States. After the operation was complete, the entire group of over 4,000 men, women, and children made the long trek to Pakistan. As a result of these attacks, severe shortages of electricity occurred in Kabul for several weeks. Most homes were without electricity, and many factories were forced to curtail operation, further damaging Kabul's troubled industrial sector.

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be attributed to resistance activity, but many others were probably the result of longstanding factionalism within the Afghan government.

At the end of 1984, the Soviets continued to garrison bases from the southern mouth to around the middle of the Panjsher Valley at Peshghor. Combat continues, particularly near Bazarek and Rokheh. The Soviets conducted a second sweep operation of limited inten-

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rescue from the hydroelectric power station, east of Kabul. During this time the resistance obtained the collaboration of a local tribal group which the Soviets previously had attempted to coopt. This action was filmed by a television crew and broadcast in the United States. After the operation was complete, the entire group of over 4,000 men, women, and children made the long trek to Pakistan. As a result of these attacks, severe shortages of electricity occurred in Kabul for several weeks. Most homes were without electricity, and many factories were forced to curtail operation, further damaging Kabul's troubled industrial sector.

Resistance bomb attacks in 1984 seriously threatened security inside Kabul. The most serious was a bomb set off at Kabul International Airport on

August 31, which caused more than 100 casualties, including 28 deaths. The Soviets then tightened security at the airport, and the regime publicized the capture and execution of the nine individuals allegedly responsible.

The resistance further undermined security at the airport by using improved surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), evidenced by the destruction in flight of several helicopters and transports. In September the resistance damaged Ariana Afghan Airlines' lone DC-10 which was later repaired and returned to Kabul. At times, the Soviets were forced to curb their activities and later

forces to control air security, and later upgraded military facilities near the airport, including new deployments of armor and artillery. By the end of the year, Kabul was regularly illuminated by brilliant flares fired from aircraft during landing or takeoff, an apparent defensive measure against mujahedin use of heat-seeking SAMs.

As in previous years, political killings inside Kabul were frequent. In June and again in November, there was a rash of assassinations—mainly of military officers and secret police agents. Some of these assassinations can

The Soviets failed to achieve either of their two major objectives—destroying the resistance in the valley and eliminating Mahsud. As in previous offensives, the mujahidin withdrew from the valley floor to the surrounding mountains and side valleys, counterattacking at every opportunity. Resistance losses were heavy, but their forces remained intact, while Soviet and regime troops probably suffered greater losses.

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In early June 1984, the Soviets carried out their largest offensive against resistance bases in and near Herat since the invasion. In the face of overwhelming opposition (10,000 Soviet and 6,000 DRA), the resistance fought a delaying action, trying to keep casualties to a minimum, while retreating from their positions in and around the city to the mountains in the north. Some resistance forces took temporary sanctuary in Iran.

In the fall, the Soviets again concentrated troops and artillery in the Herat area and began to move against the resistance. As in the Qandahar area, climatic conditions permit fighting in western Afghanistan to continue throughout the winter.

Northern Afghanistan

In general, the Soviets control the flat northern region of Afghanistan, which borders Soviet Central Asia, more effectively than any of the other four regions. This area contains the valuable natural gas of the Sheberghan region. Soviet troops sometimes have been deployed directly into northern Afghanistan from the Soviet border.

Masar e Sharif; Mazar e Sharif remained relatively calm, although scattered fighting occurred occasionally at night. Afghan troops provide most of the security, and the Soviet presence is limited inside the city.

Central Afghanistan

The Soviets have given the least priority to controlling this region, known as the Hazarajat, which is the most geographically isolated of the five regions. Internecine fighting among various resistance groups is common. Shia and Sunni groups more often fight among themselves than against the Soviets. Within the Shia groups themselves, the Iranian-backed factions have fought against the other factions.

One of the most chilling actions of the war apparently took place in the Hazarajat, in early November. Their ammunition exhausted, a large number of *mujahidin* were forced to surrender to a combined force of Soviet/DRA troops. Reportedly, after the *mujahidin* were rounded up, the Soviet commander ordered that they all be summarily executed.

[second column]

term strategy for control of Afghanistan. The Soviets have experienced considerable difficulty in pursuing those strategies over their 5 years of occupation, yet the Soviet Government continues both approaches.

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

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Short-term strategies

Foremost among their immediate goals, the Soviets want to maintain the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. The vast majority of Afghans are opposed to the Soviet supported regime. Without Soviet military backing, the Kabul government would most likely be overthrown within a short time. The USSR keeps sufficient troops in Afghanistan to assure DRA survival and minimum security in the capital.

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of large areas in Afghanistan, either because of flight to the cities or emigration of other countries, has made it more difficult for the resistance to function.

The Soviets have encouraged the Kabul regime to pursue a divide and rule strategy similar to the methods used to absorb Central Asia into the Soviet Union 50 years ago. The regime has offered bribes of money and weapons to the many independent tribes, particularly in the sensitive regions that border Pakistan. This program has often backfired, as tribes often take the money and guns and instead support the resistance. Also, KHAD agents infiltrate the resistance to assassinate resistance leaders, encourage infighting among different resistance groups, or report on the plans and positions of resistance forces.

An essential element of the Soviets' long-term strategy is the focus on the new generation. The Soviets hope to create a new elite, one committed to a pro-Soviet future for Afghanistan and which provides a loyal party and administrative cadre. In the school, communist ideology is promoted, while national disciplines are neglected [illeg]

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THE SOVIET OCCUPATION: SHORT- AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIES

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Soviets can be observed to have both short- and long-

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Long-term Strategies

Given the utter failure of their efforts to broaden regime support, the Soviets have decided to pursue a long-term strategy of "sovietization" or building a party and an administrative structure in Afghanistan modeled along Soviet lines and sensitive to Soviet interests. In pursuing this goal the Soviet Union has made limited progress.

In the absence of a negotiated settlement, Soviet long-term strategy focuses on the gradual extension of security and control throughout the country and on increasing the ability of the Kabul regime to perform this task. To implement this they have attempted, albeit with little success, to rebuild the Afghan Army. Ultimately this will require adequate numbers of recruits who are willing to defend a pro-Soviet regime, a prospect that remains far off.

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virtues are extolled in class Russian language study is mandatory at Kabul University.

The Soviets send Afghan youth to the U.S.S.R. for indoctrination in a setting isolated from their families and Afghan influences, but the success of these programs has been mixed. Youth training and education programs involve around 4,000 students sent to the Soviet Union each year for advanced political indoctrination. Already 20,000-25,000 students have been sent for such studies, more than 10,000 since 1979.

Apparently these few years of indoctrination are insufficient to mold loyal cadre. Yet the Soviets began a new program in 1984 involving plans to send thousands of children between 7 and 10 years of age, from all provinces to the Soviet Union for more than 10 years. In November, 870 Afghan children between the ages of 7 and 9 were sent to the U.S.S.R. for 10 years of schooling.

Another element of the long-term plan is the economic integration of Afghanistan into the Soviet orbit. The Soviets hope gradually to control more and more of Afghanistan's natural resources and industry. Natural gas from Afghanistan's rich northern Sheberghan gas fields is bartered for Soviet imports and to repay Afghan debts to the Soviet Union.

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The official most strongly critical in that meeting was Minister of Defense Abdul Qadar, a staunch Parcham [illeg] early December he was replaced [illeg]

**AFGHANISTAN
KABUL AND SURROUNDING
PROVINCES**

Legend:

- International boundary
- Provinces boundary
- National capital
- Road
- Pakistan refugee areas

Note: Mountains shown only around Peshawar Valley

Scale: 0 25 50 75 Kilometers

The Parcham faction consists primarily of urban-educated middle and upper class people, who usually belong to various ethnic groups other than Pashtun. The Parcham, installed in power by the Soviets, is the more influential faction in government, although comprising only about 40% of the party's membership. Parcham members predominate at the highest levels of government and party and dominate KHAD (the secret police and intelligence service).

regime political decisions. Political positions are gained by party loyalty, not on qualifications or experience.

Regime perceptions of its own shortcomings can be seen in the official media. President Babrak Karmal, when exhorting various groups, often mentions areas where performance falls short. He most commonly refers to "divisiveness" and "factionalism," clear acknowledgment of the persistence of the Parcham-Khalq split. He has lambasted the police and the KHAD for arbitrariness and abuse of power.

The official toast strongly criticized in that meeting was Minister of Defense Abdul Qader, a staunch proponent of early disarmament and a member of the

Since its foundation in the late 1960s, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) has suffered a wide rift between the Parcham (Banner) and Khalq (Mass) factions. The Soviet presence forces a coexistence between the factions, although outbreaks of violence, including assassinations, occur frequently.

The Soviet Union exercises ultimate authority over party and all significant



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Defense Minister by Chief of Staff Nur Mohammad, a Khalq oriented military professional who has spent several years in the Soviet Union.

Another significant regime change was the posting of former Minister of Finance Abdul Wakil, a cousin of Karmal, as Ambassador to Vietnam. Diplomatic assignments to socialist countries as when Karmal himself was sent to Prague, have been used by the regime to get prominent but unwanted figures out of the country where they can do (or come to) no harm.

KHAD, the Afghan intelligence service was a small organization under the state police with a limited role in intelligence collection and state security before the Soviet invasion. After the Soviet takeover this service was named KHAD, enlarged and strengthened and given authority over all intelligence aspects of Afghan affairs at home and abroad. Soviet advisers were installed, and KHAD became unofficially subordinate to the KGB. KHAD has frequently exercised its power to jail or discredit national-level officials, confiscate property, infiltrate the resistance, and indoctrinate the populace in communism.

Afghan Military. Parcham-Khalq factionalism contributes substantially to the ineffectiveness of the military. Armed clashes, low morale, insufficient manpower, collaboration with the resistance, and lessened security are all symptomatic of this dispute. Furthermore, many conscripts from the military defect because of unwillingness to participate in Soviet reprisals on civilians, Soviet heavy-handedness and arrogance, and the use of Afghan soldiers as "canon fodder." The Afghan military has dwindled from about 90,00 troops in December 1979 to about 40,000 in late 1984.

The majority of Afghan soldiers are conscripted, often by press-gang techniques, and in 1984 the draft age was lowered from 17 to 16 in March, when the length of military service for troops serving in Kabul was extended from 3 to 4 years, large numbers of soldiers mutinied. Because of the high rate of desertions with weapons, Afghan soldiers must turn in their equipment when not fighting.

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THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Popular support for the Afghan resistance remains firm among the vast majority of the Afghan people. The resistance movement includes resistance fighters in Afghanistan, parties both inside and outside Afghanistan, and the refugee and exile community. The resistance inside Afghanistan consists of independent local bands, usually affiliated to one or another of the parties. The important parties have

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formed a three-party "moderate" alliance and a seven-party "fundamentalist" alliance. Numerous other factions are not involved in the alliances.

No major changes occurred in the structure of the resistance during 1984. Some groups of resistance fighters have increased coordination and cooperation in the fight against Soviet /DRA forces. Nevertheless, fighting between resistance groups continues to take place. The emergence of a single leader, or any real political unity, is as elusive as ever.

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Soviet/DRA forces by opening nearby fronts. However, other groups continued to dispute supplies and areas.

In Herat during June, various resistance groups cooperated in evacuating the city center before the beginning of Soviet door-to-door searches. In the last part of the year, as the Soviets turned their attacks to Paktia and Paktika, where they hoped to cut the infiltration routes, effective resistance cooperation included affiliates of the three-party moderate alliance.

Resistance commanders from inside the country continued to voice complaints against the parties' leaders. Charges included unequal distribution of support, selling arms for personal enrichment, and lack of contact with what was going on inside the country. Many commanders say they maintained their allegiances only because it was necessary to obtain arms and appeared willing to support any leaders who would supply them.

Although there is no current threat of widespread famine, poor rain and snowfall, Soviet destruction of agriculture in a particular area. Inter-

No major changes occurred in the structure of the resistance during 1984. Some groups of resistance fighters have increased coordination and cooperation in the fight against Royal DRC forces. Nevertheless, fighting between resistance groups continues to take place. The emergence of a single leader or any real political unity is an elusive prospect.

All seven major resistance leaders from Peshawar were invited by the Pakistan Government to attend the Islamic Conference summit in Rabat in January, 1984. They agreed, for the first time, to let fundamentalist leader Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani serve as spokesman for the group. Professor Rabbani also visited France in April to meet with French officials and other private groups.

The Panjaber commander Mahsud continued his efforts to make contact with and develop plans for cooperation with other commanders of the northeast region during the first part of the year. These efforts appeared to pay dividends during the Soviet offensive, as various mujahideen groups made efforts to come to Mahsud's assistance and divert

Depopulation of civilians in strategic areas becomes a more serious problem for the mujahideen. In the first years of the resistance, mujahideen could count on shelter and food from villages throughout the country. The toll of 5 years of fighting has left many areas—especially those in the east and close to Kabul—almost deserted. Resistance leaders are sometimes forced not only to carry their own food but also to help supply the civilian population.

With about one-third of its pre-1979 population displaced, Afghanistan has had its social structure and economy disrupted in fundamental ways. Afghanistan has suffered severe deterioration in the areas of health, medicine, and education. Nevertheless, food and fuel supplies are generally adequate both among the resistance fighters and Afghan civilians.

Although there is no current threat of widespread famine, poor crop and snowfall, Soviet destruction of agriculture in a particular area...

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

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ruption of trade could change the local food situation quickly. For example, the Pnjar offensive-involving massive Soviet bombing that destroyed agriculture and livestock-has caused food shortages among the resistance and the local civilian population.

Although the resistance forces experience inadequate food supplies at times, the need for medicine and medical services is probably greater. Certain international humanitarian organizations, most prominently French groups, such as *Medicina sans Frontieres* and *Aide Medicale Internationale*, are trying to alleviate this desperate situation by maintaining doctors and rudimentary hospitals inside Afghanistan. Soviet and regime forces have often tried to bomb or attack these clinics and in 1983 captured and released a French doctor.

Education has deteriorated considerably since the Soviet invasion. The school system has ceased everywhere except in a few major cities. Perhaps 80% of the Afghan teachers have been executed or imprisoned or have fled the country.

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refugees-the world's largest refugee population. Most of the refugees are located in some 340 camps, primarily in the rural areas of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. (See map, p. 8)

The Afghan refugees are minimally but adequately supplied with food, shelter, clothing, and medicine. Relief is provided by Pakistan, and by the international community primarily through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN World Food Program (WFP). Major contributors to the relief program are Saudi Arabia and other Arab states of the gulf, Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. The U.S. Government contributed about \$70 million for the Afghan refugees in fiscal year 1984, including \$49 million through the WFP. This was approximately one-third the total international contributions for Afghan refugee relief. To date, total U.S. contributions to the Afghan refugee relief program exceed \$350 million.

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Government began relocating refugees from the provincial capitals of NWFP (Peshawar) and Bluchistan (Quetta) to outlying rural areas for the stated purpose of alleviating the urban problems caused by the refugees. All single Afghan males were ordered to relocate from housing in Peshawar or nearby refugee camps to areas away from the city. After a series of bomb explosions in Peshawar, Afghan

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political parties were ordered to move their headquarters
outside the city.

Under an effort to reduce refugee concentration, the Government of Pakistan has relocated some refugees and guided new arrivals to other areas but with mixed success. Several hundred thousand places for refugees are planned for a group of camps near Mianwali, in Punjab Province. Many of the original grossed there moved away in the hot summer months to cooler encampments in the mountains of the NWFP. Plans to relocate refugees within Pakistan have met with mixed success in the past.

refugees in Iran, but most refugees live among the Iranian population and not in camps. Iran provides limited assistance to the refugees through the government's own resources, and some aid is received from UNHCR.

The herds of goats, camels, and sheep that the refugees bring with them destroy, through overgrazing, land in the already economically depressed areas of the NWFP and Baluchistan. Also, the refugees compete with the local population for the limited number of available jobs. In recent years a large percentage of the native male NWFP labor force has emigrated to work in Persian Gulf countries. Because of diminished employment prospects in the gulf, some of these workers are returning to Pakistan, and few are being recruited. The prospective competition for jobs could fuel tension between the Pakistanis and the Afghan refugees.

During the debate, the Soviets and the NRA insisted that the situation in Afghanistan was an internal Afghan matter and, therefore, not a fit subject for UN scrutiny and that the presence of Soviet troops was a bilateral matter governed by a treaty between the two countries. They have stated that Soviet troops would no longer be necessary and would be withdrawn after outside intervention had ceased.

To lessen potential resentment of the refugees, the Pakistan Government has taken several actions. Afghan refugees are forbidden to own land or businesses. During 1984 the Pakistan

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The Kabul regime and the Soviet Union demand that "noninterference" be guaranteed by Pakistan and international powers, possibly to include the United States, and appear reluctant to accept extension of the guarantees to any other part of an agreement.

Pakistan continues to refuse to recognize or talk with the Karmal regime and refuses to pledge anything before there is a Soviet agreement to withdraw. Pakistan has expressed its wish that international guarantee cover all points or an agreement.

UN attempts to negotiate a settlement date from November 1980 mandate of the General Assembly. Negotiations are led by UN under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordoves as a personal representative of the Secretary General. Talks have been held periodically in Geneva. Cordoves shuttled between delegations from Pakistan and Afghanistan, officially informing Iran of the discussions while unofficially informing the Soviets. The third and latest round of UN sponsored indirect talks in Geneva between Pakistan and Afghanistan was held from August 24 to August 31, 1984, and ended without progress.

Despite the hopes that were generated during the 1988 talks, the sides remain far apart. The Soviet Union

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has not substantially altered its original position. Essential questions, such as self determination for the Afghans, consultations with Afghan representatives, the identity of guarantees, have yet to be addressed. But both sides are committed to continuing the talks, and another round is scheduled for February 1986. The United States continues to support the UN negotiating process based on the four points of the UN resolution. Also, the United States supports efforts to achieve unity of all Afghan groups, whether in exile or struggling inside the country

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remain capable of ruling-internally divided and with no significant popular backing.

The Afghan people, on the other hand, despite tremendous privations and the dislocations attendant to modern warfare practiced against a traditional society, show every sign of persevering. Their support for the resistance seems unflagging. While some resistance groups increased cooperation during 1984, a broad degree of unity still would be insufficient to militarily eject the Soviets. Yet the Soviets are unable to prevent the resistance from effectively attacking in all areas of the country, including Kabul, the nerve center of Soviet control.

